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Intuition and Science in the Race
Jurisprudence of Justice Blackmun
by DEBORAH C. MALAMUD*
Introduction
In the field of race, Justice Harry A. Blackmun is known, first and
foremost, for his separate opinion in Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke.' That opinion, written after "earnest and... 'prayer-
ful' consideration," 2 is Justice Blackmun's most eloquent statement on
issues of race:
I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come
when an "affirmative action" program is unnecessary and is, in
truth, only a relic of the past. I would hope that we could reach
this stage within a decade at the most. But the story of Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), decided almost a quar-
ter of a century ago, suggests that that hope is a slim one. At
some time, however, beyond any period of what some would
claim is only transitional inequality, the United States must and
will reach a stage of maturity where action along this line is no
longer necessary. Then persons will be regarded as persons, and
discrimination of the type we address today will be an ugly fea-
ture of history that is instructive but that is behind us .... I
suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-
action program in a racially neutral way and have it be success-
ful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order
to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There
is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we
must treat them differently. We cannot - we dare not - let the
Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy?
While color-blindness is the right principle for the ideal world, he said,
we live in the real world. "The sooner we get down the road toward
* Professor, University of Michigan Law School; clerk for Justice Blackmun, Octo-
ber Term 1988. My thanks to Abigail Carter for her able research assistance.
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. May 1, 1978, memorandum to the Conference, Library of Congress, Papers of
Thurgood Marshal, Opinion Files, Bakke, Container 204 Folder 1 (hereinafter cited as
Blackmun Bakke Memo), at 1, reprinted in BERNARD ScHwARz, BEniNm Bakke: Affirm-
ative Action and the Supreme Court app. at 248 (1988).
3. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402, 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
accepting and being a part of the real world, and not shutting it out
and away from us, the sooner will these difficulties vanish from the
scene."
4
Similarly ringing language can be found in two of Justice Black-
mun's race opinions eleven years later, from a Term well-known for its
conservative race decisions. In a separate dissenting opinion in City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co..' the case in which the Court first an-
nounced that affirmative action programs would be subject to strict
scrutiny, Justice Blackmun decried the result:
I never thought that I would live to see the day when the city of
Richmond, Virginia, the cradle of the Old Confederacy, sought
on its own, within a narrow confine, to lessen the stark impact of
persistent discrimination. But Richmond, to its great credit, ac-
ted. Yet this Court, the supposed bastion of equality, strikes
down Richmond's efforts as though discrimination had never ex-
isted or was not demonstrated in this particular litigation.... So
the Court today regresses. I am confident, however, that, given
time, it one day again will do its best to fulfill the great promises
of the Constitution's Preamble and of the guarantees embodied
in the Bill of Rights - a fulfillment that would make this Nation
very special.6
And, again, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,7 a Title VII case
redefining the core elements of the disparate impact proof structure,
Justice Blackmun used strong language in response to the Court's up-
holding of the "plantation economy" of an Alaskan cannery: "One
wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimination -
or, more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites - is a prob-
lem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was."8
Are these ringing calls for racial justice the core of Justice Black-
mun's race jurisprudence? Certainly they are significant contributions
to the national debate on race. If stirring rhetoric defines the core of
Justice Blackmun's race jurisprudence, however, one must conclude
that his engagement with issues of race was sporadic and uneven-for
no such declarations issued from Justice Blackmun's pen in the years
before Bakke and between Bakke and Croson. He did not speak
often in the urgent voice with which he is most associated in the field
of race. For that reason, some scholars with whom I have discussed
4. Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
5. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
6. Ild. at 561-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
7. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
8. lId at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the question of Justice Blackmun's race jurisprudence have ques-
tioned whether he had one.
Surely one element of a race jurisprudence is the cultivation of a
unique voice, one that can awaken and teach the nation. But that is
only one part - not even the most important part - of a race jurispru-
dence. To fully appreciate both Justice Blackmun's struggle to de-
velop a race jurisprudence and the contributions those efforts made to
the Court's work in that field, one must look to the other, more work-
aday, elements of the adjudication of race cases.
What does it mean for a judge or justice to have a race jurispru-
dence? In general, one can identify six elements of a race jurispru-
dence, of which voice is only one. The first, and perhaps the most
important, ingredient of a race jurisprudence is its scope. What is a
race case? There is a core group of cases that all would recognize as
race cases - namely, cases dealing with intentional discrimination
against African-Americans or members of other groups we customa-
rily identify as "racially" distinct. Outside of that core, how does a
justice know a race case when he or she sees it? Take, for instance,
our rights discourse. We identify core rights and then, not without
controversy, circle them with broad penumbra or protect them
through doctrines of overbreadth. Or think in Talmudic terms. So
that the biblical commandments are not violated, the Talmud builds
"fences" around them. These fences prohibit conduct which ap-
proaches or resembles actions prohibited by biblical law, in order to
diminish the risk that core prohibitions will be violated. In these
terms, one key characteristic of a justice's race jurisprudence is the
breadth of the protective ring around the core. What of cases involv-
ing facially neutral government decisions that are racially suspect, be-
cause of either their context or their effects? What about
discrimination against groups that are not defined as racially distinct,
but are nonetheless stigmatized? Are alienage cases, or cases involv-
ing Native American rights, race cases? What about areas of socio-
legal practice that do not directly pertain to race but have become
racialized in practice? Does the justice see the death penalty - or is-
sues of criminal justice in general - as sufficiently racialized to warrant
special concern?
Another marker of a race jurisprudence is its sense of time.
Where does the justice place the present day in the timeline of the
transition from slavery to racial equality? Are we far enough from the
period of de jure discrimination so that its effects are no longer perva-
sive? What is an acceptable rate of progress in achieving racial equal-
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ity? Do the answers to these questions differ for different areas of
social life, such as education, political participation, or employment?
A race jurisprudence is also defined by its degree of focus.
Whatever the breadth of the categorical race case, and however close
to racism's historical source and far from finding a solution we may
be, the fight to end racism is but one goal and obligation of the courts.
The courts are also charged, for example, with preserving principles of
federalism and separation of powers. A justice's race jurisprudence
will be more or less aggressive depending upon the extent to which
the desire to remedy race discrimination (however broadly defined) is
permitted to outweigh other countervailing constitutional values.
In addition, a race jurisprudence requires a sense of method. Can
society trust judges to know racism when they see it? If not, how can
they be taught to see it? The Supreme Court has developed proof
structures that aim to move the detection of racism from gestalt to
something more closely approximating quantitative social science. A
justice's level of adherence to these proof structures, and his or her
acceptance of their results when proof structures and gestalt point in
different directions, is another central characteristic of the justice's
race jurisprudence.
Another key element of a race jurisprudence is its transparency,
meaning the degree to which it openly manifests doubt. The task of
unraveling a long history of official and private racism in the United
States is inevitably a difficult one. Close judgments must be made,
with sweeping constitutional consequences. Opinions can be written
to obscure the difficulties of the task and the closeness of the cases, or
they can be written to make the struggle transparent. Justices differ
widely on this dimension - and the entire tone of a race jurisprudence
can turn on the choices made in this domain.
For our purposes, then a race jurisprudence is not only about
voice, but is also, and more fundamentally, about scope, time, focus,
method, and transparency. When one looks at the development of
Justice Blackmun's race jurisprudence over time, the most central is-
sue is the issue of method. The opinions for which Justice Blackmun is
best known are full of a gestalt understanding of how race and racism
do their work in American society. But if one looks back to Justice
Blackmun's years on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit and his opinions in the Supreme Court across a range
of issues and across the span of years, one sees that his intuitions did
not always register the presence of race, and - more important - that
he did not always trust his own intuitions to lead him to the right an-
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swer. One finds that Justice Blackmun put considerable energy and
faith, in the middle years of his career on the Court, into the formula-
tion and use of formal proof structures and statistical methodologies
as methods for revealing the presence of race to those with less-than-
reliable intuitive capacities. Only when those methods seemed to him
to have failed did the urgent voice of Bakke reemerge.
I. A Cautious Start: Two Starting Points in the
Eighth Circuit
Justice Blackmun often spoke with pride about his time on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In particular,
it meant a great deal to him that the Eighth was a "North-South cir-
cuit." Stretching from Minnesota to Arkansas, the Eighth Circuit
brought its northern judges into direct contact with two issues they did
not have occasion to encounter in their own state: the issues of race
and the death penalty.
An account of Judge Blackmun's Eight Circuit race jurisprudence
must surely include Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer9 - a Missouri case in
which he was reversed by the Supreme Court.10 The issue in the case
was whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified at 24 U.S.C. section
1982 bars all race discrimination in the private sale of real estate.
Judge Blackmun was scholarly and energetic in exploring a number of
approaches that might lead to a judgment for the plaintiff, but in the
end concluded that too much Supreme Court precedent made it im-
possible for "an inferior tribunal"" such as his own to take the lead.
He made clear, however, that he would welcome being proven wrong.
"It would not be too surprising if the Supreme Court one day were to
hold that a court errs when it dismisses a complaint of this kind" by
following one of the pathways he had so carefully laid out.' 2
A case like Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer surely reflects on a judge's
race jurisprudence, in that a judge whose jurisprudence was more
sharply focused on race might have been willing to read prior
Supreme Court cases with less deference in order to reach a progres-
sive result. Nonetheless, even judges who are deeply concerned with
race discrimination have to pick their battles. In the mid-1960's, the
Supreme Court was showing no reluctance to take the lead on civil
rights issues - meaning that lower court judges who felt bound by
9. 379 F.2d 33 (1967).
10. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (with Justices Harlan and White dissenting).
11. Jones, 379 F.2d at 45.
12. Id. at 44.
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Supreme Court precedent had every reason to believe that the Court
would set things right. Furthermore, Congress was also active in the
field in this period. Judge Blackmun's opinion appeals to Congress to
enact fair housing legislation, 3 and it did so in 1968.14 Justice Harlan
argued in dissent in the Supreme Court that the newly-enacted fair
housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 were far better
suited to deal with discrimination in housing sales than was section
1982. "The political process now having taken hold again in this very
field, I am at a loss to understand why the Court should have deemed
it appropriate or, in the circumstances of this case, necessary to pro-
ceed with such precipitate and insecure strides."' 5 With the real possi-
bility of such legislation in the background, a racially-aware lower-
court judge need not be faulted for staying his hand.
A far better sense of Judge Blackmun's developing race jurispru-
dence can be gained from looking at cases in which he had more deci-
sional freedom. Discussion of two such cases follows.
1. School Desegregation: Smith v. Board of Education (1966)
As is well known, Brown v. Board of Education'6 brought in its
wake decades of litigation dealing with school desegregation and its
aftershocks. Smith v. Board of Education of Morrilton School District
No. 321 involved the implications of school desegregation for the
black teachers who had staffed the separate-but-not-equal black
schools of the de jure segregation era. A favored mechanism for im-
plementing desegregation was the school-choice plan, in which stu-
dents and their families could choose either the formerly all-white
schools or the formerly all-black schools. In school systems like Mor-
rilton's, where the physical plant and general resources of the all-black
schools were inferior to those of the all-white schools,' 8 it was reason-
able to expect that the result of school-choice would be that the vast
majority of children would choose the previously all-white schools,
and that the all-black schools would lose their enrollments. Without a
commitment by school districts massively to reallocate resources, or
13. See id. at 45 ("Relief for the plaintiff lies, we think, in fair housing legislation which
will be tempered by the policy and exemption considerations which enter into thoughtfully
considered statutes.").
14. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73. I make no causal claim
here.
15. Jones, 392 U.S. at 478.
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
18. See id. at 779. Cf Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 (discussing school districts in which
equalization of resources was underway).
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absent white opposition to integration vehement enough to make the
white schools an impossible choice for black students, the previously
white schools were the preferable places to be. What was to happen
to the black teachers when the black schools lost their enrollment?
The Morrilton School District in Arkansas presented this prob-
lem to the Eighth Circuit in a particularly interesting form. The Dis-
trict had a facially neutral rule that if a school was closed or
consolidated for any reason and the teachers in the closed school
could not be absorbed into the remaining schools without displacing
other teachers, the teachers in the closed school would be fired.' 9 The
district court found that the rule had been consistently and neutrally
applied in eleven occasions in the past, and held that the firing of the
black teachers pursuant to the rule did not violate their rights under
the Equal Protection Clause.20 To hold otherwise, the district court
held, would "give Negro teachers a stability of tenure not possessed
by white teachers."'21
Judge Blackmun, writing for a unanimous court, obviously felt
strongly that this result could not stand. Neutral though the rule
might be, this clearly to him was a case about race. He observed that
the District had done nothing to respond to Brown for a decade; thus,
the patterns of teacher assignment that existed in the District were the
direct result of continuing unlawful discrimination.22 He argued that
in adopting a school choice plan, the District must have understood
that the black schools would be abandoned.' Indeed, the Superinten-
dent acknowledged in his testimony that the plant of the black high
school was "not a type plant that the Board or I would like our chil-
dren to attend school in"24 and that its teaching staff "did not ap-
proach the level of the white slate."'  What this meant, Judge
Blackmun held, was that "the [black] teachers did indeed owe their
dismissals in a very real sense to improper racial considerations."26
Thus, even though the teacher dismissals - and the choice plan - were
not shown to be racially motivated, and even though the general pol-
icy was recognized not to be unreasonable, the dismissals could not
stand so long as race was at the root of the situation on the ground.
19. See Smith, 365 F.2d at 778.
20. See id. at 779.
21. Id. at 775 (discussing the district court's holding).
22. See id at 779.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Id
26. Id. at 780.
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This decision, while morally compelling, took a measure of legal
creativity. The school district surely could have anticipated that white
children would not choose the formerly black schools. However, it
was not so certain that the black community would embrace integra-
tion en masse, given the obvious and open hostility of the white ad-
ministration towards integration for the previous decade. Perhaps a
considerable number of black parents had hoped, instead, that deseg-
regation would lead to an improvement in the resources allocated to
the previously black schools. Even more significantly, it was not
merely the abandonment of the black schools that created the condi-
tions for the discharge of the black teachers. It was also necessary
that the white schools be able to accommodate the newly-entering
black students without any increase in staff. Nowhere does the court
claim that this was readily predictable. Finally, it was not clear that
the black teachers would have been entitled to positions in the newly
integrated schools if some other method of resolving the shortage of
positions had been fashioned. At least some would have been entitled
to positions under a seniority system. But would the use of seniority
as the decisional criterion have been constitutionally required? What
if the criterion had been academic qualifications or some other mea-
sure of teacher quality? The Superintendent's testimony that the
black teaching staff was not of the same level as white teaching staff -
a fact known generally to be the case because of the pervasive inferi-
ority of the educational opportunities offered to blacks in the South -
was noted by the court in showing the racialized nature of the dis-
charges, but was ignored when it came to the question of remedy.2 7
Judge Blackmun was correct that "teaching is an art" and that teacher
quality is hard to assess from the sidelines.' Yet it could not be de-
nied that, taken as a whole, the black staff was at a lower level of
professional development than the white staff because that fact, too,
was part of the racial history of the South.
The creativity of Judge Blackmun's opinion - and the work that it
did to reach the morally correct result - lay in his willingness simulta-
neously to pay attention to the operation of race when necessary to
remedy racism and to ignore the operation of race when doing so
27. See id. at 781-82. The court ably explained why it rejected a number of other
justifications for not offering vacancies to black teachers - like the fact that white teachers
would do a better job of relating to the problems white students faced in an integrating
school system - but did not take on the question of the fact that a black candidate "may be
considered inferior because he attended a poorly regarded Negro college ... or because he
fails to pass an objective qualification test." Id. at 782.
28. Id. at 781.
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would stand in the way of that remedy. We see in Smith an aggres-
sively liberal race jurisprudence in nascent form. Where Judge Black-
mun determined that the period of rampant and de jure discrimination
had not yet faded into the past and that the dispute concerned a social
program as important as education, he manifested a willingness to
keep his focus on the problem of race and to compromise the govern-
ment's ability to enforce racially-neutral and otherwise reasonable
policies. His method was intuitive. While there was some testimony
suggesting that the school district knew the burdens that would befall
the black faculty, that testimony was only compelling in the context of
Judge Blackmun's background understanding of how race operated in
the South. And the opinion was written to permit no doubt: there was
no suggestion that the case was a difficult one, as it seems to me it was
on the legal (if surely not on the moral) level.
2. Death Penalty: Maxwell v. Bishop (1968)
Maxwell v. Bishop29 concerned race and the death penalty, and
was, in a sense, a precursor to the Court's 1987 decision in McCleskey
v. Kemp.30 Compared to Smith v. Board of Education, Maxwell shows
a judge less focused on race, and less willing to bridge the evidentiary
gaps in favor of black rights-seekers and against state and local
governments.
William Maxwell was a black defendant who was sentenced to
death by the state of Arkansas for raping a white woman.31 In a strat-
egy that prefigured the use of the Baldus study in McCleskey,32 the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund utilized a study showing racial dispari-
ties in the use of the death sentence for rape cases. The study sur-
veyed twelve southern states, and included a sample of Arkansas
counties that comprised just under a majority of the population of the
state. The study found that, compared to other rape defendants,
blacks convicted of raping white women were disproportionately sen-
tenced to death. The State of Arkansas presented no evidence in op-
position to the study, but used cross-examination to raise doubts
about its probity. The court, with Judge Blackmun writing, shared
those doubts and affirmed the district court's rejection of the claim of
racial bias.33
29. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
30. 481 U.S. 279 (1987), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 112-28.
31. See Maxwell, 398 F.2d 138.
32. 481 U.S. at 279-320 (majority opinion), 345-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33. See Maxwell, 398 U.S. at 266.
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In language preshadowing his dissent in Furman v. Georgia,3 4
Judge Blackmun observed that this was an extremely difficult case on
a personal level:
[T]he decisional process in a case of this kind [is] particularly
excruciating for the author of this opinion, who is not personally
convinced of the rightness of capital punishment and who ques-
tions it as an effective deterrent. But the advisability of capital
punishment is a policy matter ordinarily to be resolved by the
legislature or through executive clemency and not by the
judiciary."
The situation worsens when a judge who is uncomfortable with the
death penalty must face race discrimination in its application. If the
Equal Protection Clause is allegedly violated by a state's death pen-
alty practice, is the presumption against judicial involvement re-
versed? Or is state discretion so important that the need to preserve it
serves as a check against aggressive use of new Equal Protection theo-
ries where the death penalty is concerned? What if the discriminatory
use of the death penalty is known to have been a part of standard
legal practice in the "Jim Crow" South? These questions of scope ("Is
the death penalty about race?"), focus ("How heavily do we weigh the
state's interest in its death penalty?"), and time ("Do we presume
continuity or discontinuity with the Jim Crow past?") were the ques-
tions underlying Maxwell's case.
In principle, Judge Blackmun was not opposed to the use of sta-
tistical evidence to prove discrimination. As a former mathemati-
cian,36 he paid particularly close attention to the study's methodology
and found it lacking in important respects. The Arkansas data cov-
ered a period of more than twenty years. This earned the observation
that "improper state practice of the past does not automatically invali-
date a procedure of the present. ' 37 The Arkansas data were limited
to counties with large black populations, clustered in the southeastern
part of the state, while Garland County, where Maxwell was tried and
sentenced, is in the predominantly white northwestern part of the
state. Judge Blackmun was not prepared to assume the same patterns
applied to these different areas, particularly because Maxwell's case
was the only rape case in which the death penalty had been imposed
34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Cases such as these provide for
me an excruciating agony of the spirit.") Furman is discussed at length in Malcolm Stew-
art's contribution to this symposium. See Malcom L. Stewart, Justice Blackmun's Capital
Punishment Jurisprudence, 26 HAsTINWGS CONST. L. Q.
35. Furman, 408 U.S. at 266 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Justice Blackmun majored in mathematics at Harvard.
37. Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 148.
[Vol. 26:73
in Garland County. It was suggested that blacks in general were ad-
versely affected by defense counsel's unwillingness to claim that a
white woman had consented to sex with the defendant, but Maxwell's
own case involved violent assault and, as a result, consent was not
reasonably at issue. The NAACP also argued that the broad statistical
pattern was due in part to petit jury discrimination, but there was no
evidence of such discrimination in Maxwell's case. In light of these
and other flaws in the study and in its application to Maxwell's case,
Judge Blackmun concluded that "we are not yet ready to condemn
and upset the result reached in every case of a negro rape defendant
in the State of Arkansas on the basis of broad theories of social and
statistical injustice. 38
Why did the inadequacies of the study in Maxwell mean that the
defendant had failed to make even a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion? As Smith v. Board of Education suggests, much of the South
operated for a decade or more in flagrant disregard of Brown. Why,
then, was it presumed that things had changed in the South in the field
of criminal justice in general or of the death penalty in particular?
Why was it presumed that the rape of a white woman by a black man
would receive categorically gentler treatment by prosecutors and ju-
ries in the white northwest of the state than in the black southeast?
Recall that the state put on no evidence at all in the face of the study.
Were the inferences suggested by the study so weak as to be effec-
tively countered by silence? Even though sophisticated in mathemat-
ics, was Judge Blackmun unaware of how difficult it would be to
present statistically significant results if samples were required to be
limited to recent years and to counties with few blacks?
Perhaps Judge Blackmun's response to the survey's inadequacies
were based in part on the problems the case presented for equal pro-
tection theory and method. Judge Blackmun asked NAACP attorney
Tony Amsterdam whether, if the statistical evidence were accepted
and the death penalty held unconstitutional for black defendants who
rape white women, it would still be constitutional for the state to sen-
tence white rape defendants to death.39 Amsterdam responded that it
would be - but that "once the negro situation was remedied the white
situation 'would take care of itself." 4 Amsterdam implicitly sug-
gested that the state would quickly abandon the use of the death pen-
alty in rape cases once it could no longer be used against blacks who
38. Id. at 147.
39. See id. at 148.
40. Id.
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rape white women. Judge Blackmun was not prepared to accept this
theory - stating that "the legal logic and rightness of this totally es-
capes us."41 He wanted the law to impose formal equality. "We are
not inclined to accept as constitutional doctrine an abstraction which
provides equality only through assumed and hoped-for day-to-day
practicalities. It is the law, not probabilities or possibilities, which
must afford equal protection."'42
Here again, he might have gone the other way. Was there any-
thing more peculiar here as a matter of equal protection theory than
was presented in Smith? Judge Blackmun's decision in Smith was
predicated on an understanding that true equality sometimes required
deviating from facially equal treatment, and that decisions in race
cases could be proper even if they invalidated a rule only as applied to
a black plaintiff class. Why was he not prepared to apply the same
approach to the death penalty? Perhaps he was bending over back-
ward not to let his own uneasiness about the death penalty influence
his decision. For whatever reason, Judge Blackmun did not allow his
intuitions about race in the South to dictate the result in Maxwell.
3. Lessons from the Eighth Circuit Cases
Taken together, Smith and Maxwell show a judge deep in the pro-
cess of staking out the judicial role in the transition to a post-Jim-
Crow South. In education, Judge Blackmun showed a sense of ur-
gency fueled by his own sense of the centrality of education to black
progress, as well as by the South's decade-long and well-known refusal
to abide by Brown. There, Judge Blackmun took a leadership role in
making sure that the dismantling of desegregation did not work its
own injustice on the black community. Elsewhere, as manifested in
his treatment of the death penalty, Judge Blackmun seemed inclined
to give the South a chance to prove itself. Judge Blackmun had
learned how to see race in unexpected places, but he was not always
inclined to do so.
11. An Early "Hard Case" at the Supreme Court: Palmer v.
Thompson (1971)
One of the earliest race cases Justice Blackmun encountered in
his time on the Supreme Court was Palmer v. Thompson,43 the famous
Fourteenth Amendment case in which the city of Jackson, Mississippi
41. Id
42. Id.
43. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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closed its public swimming pools in the face of a desegregation order.
Blacks filed a class action to challenge the closure.4 The district court
and court of appeals denied relief to the plaintiffs, and the Supreme
Court eventually affirmed by a 5-4 vote, with six opinions.45 Justice
Blackmun admitted to the Conference before casting his vote that he
found the case "one of the most troublesome ones of the 1970
Term,' 46 and he began his concurring opinion with the words "[c]ases
such as this are 'hard' cases for there is much to be said on each
side."'47 He was right that while "[i]n isolation this litigation may not
be of great importance" (since, after all, blacks had many greater
needs than swimming pools), it would prove to "have significant impli-
cations. '48 The case became a classic illustration of the failure of the
Court to see racism at work in public decisionmaking.4 9
To Justice Black, writing for the Court, the case was straightfor-
ward. The city of Jackson was under no constitutional obligation to
provide public swimming pools. The decision to close the pools ad-
versely affected blacks and whites equally, for neither group could
thereafter use them. Justice Black would not consider the plaintiff
class' argument that the decision to close the pools was motivated by
the city's desire to avoid integration. "[N]o case in this Court has held
that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the
motivations of the men who voted for it."50 So long as the pools were
closed "to black and white alike," there was no discrimination.5' The
city was not obligated to operate pools, and it was free to close them
"for any reason, sound or unsound.""2
Three of the dissenting justices - White, Brennan, and Marshall
- also saw the case as straightforward.53 Their method placed race at
the core of the decision. First was the consideration of time. The city
of Jackson had long ignored Brown. It had hardly begun its move
away from de jure segregation and its actions were therefore suspect.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 218 (for a roadmap of the opinions in the case).
46. Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers, Opinion Files, Container 70
Folder 1, Memorandum, Feb. 12, 1971.
47. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 228 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
48. 1& at 228-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49. See Charles Lawrence, The Ego, The Id, and Equal Protection, 39 STAN. L. Rnv.
317 (1987).
50. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224.
51. Id. at 226.
52. Id at 227.
53. See id. at 240 (White, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting). (Jus-
tice Douglas also dissented.)
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The city's seemingly neutral economic reason was not really neutral.
The operating losses the city predicted were obviously attributable to
the expected unwillingness of whites in the city to use integrated
pools. For the dissenters, private racism ceased to be private when it
was allowed to shape public decision making. Furthermore, the dis-
senters' method stressed the cultural meaning of the government's ac-
tions, by asking whether the decision was likely to stigmatize the black
community. The dissenters argued that the barring of integrated
swimming pools - a setting in which blacks and whites come into far
more intimate contact than in other public facilities - was a public
endorsement of whites' belief in the inferiority and the polluting na-
ture of the black body. As Justice White put it, "[c]losing pools to
prevent interracial swimming is little different from laws or customs
forbidding Negroes and whites from eating together or from cohab-
iting or intermarrying."54 In the face of what the dissenters perceived
as blatant racism of the city's decision, they were willing to impose on
the city the economic costs of operating integrated pools which would
likely be underutilized by the white majority and thus make no eco-
nomic sense to run. This result is what a single-minded focus on race
required.
Justice Blackmun explained to the Conference that he found the
case "troublesome," though "perhaps it should not be troublesome,
but I seem to see persuasive arguments on each side."55 He eventu-
ally followed his initial inclination to affirm, an inclination that was
based on the following:
I am particularly impressed by the fact that Jackson did quickly
integrate its other facilities, and I am disturbed by the conces-
sion made by counsel, in answer to my inquiry at oral argument,
that if we reverse, the city will be 'locked in' and can never close
its pools for economic reasons even of the highest gravity.56
While awaiting the dissent, Justice Blackmun consulted with Justice
Black as to whether affirming the power of Jackson to close its pools
was consistent with the Court's holding, in Orleans Parish School
Board v. Bush,57 that the State of Louisiana could not constitutionally
close all public schools ordered to be integrated.5 8 Justice Black re-
sponded that Bush left open the possibility that a state or municipality
54. Id. at 241 (White, J., dissenting). See also id. at 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers, Opinion Files, Container 70 File
1, Blackmun Memorandum to Justice Black, Feb. 12, 1971.
56. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 241 (White, J., dissenting).
57. 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
58. See Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers, Container 70 File 1, Black
Memorandum to Justice Blackmun, Feb. 16, 1971.
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could constitutionally decide "for any reason, good or bad" to get out
of the business of taxing its citizens to provide public schools.5 9 By
implication, a municipality could certainly get out of the swimming
pool business for economic reasons, whatever the cause of the eco-
nomic hardship might be.
Justice Blackmun eventually joined Justice Black's opinion in
Palmer, but also filed an opinion of his own.60 He began by charting
out the different methods used by Justices Black and White, who were
divided on the issue of whether unconstitutionality could be based on
legislative motive rather than upon effects. He did not explain why he
joined Justice Black's opinion on that issue. Instead, he set forth that
he "remained impressed" with a number of factors.6 He noted that
swimming pools were the only public facilities that the city decided to
close, and that the city integrated all of the others - albeit as a result
of court orders.62 The pools were not part of the educational system.63
They were, instead, a "luxury," a service of the "nice-to-have but not
essential variety."'  The pools were operating on a deficit and the city
thought they would continue to do so. In light of the economic ration-
ality of the city's decision, he wrote, it would require "speculation" to
agree with the dissenters that one could see in the city's closure of the
pools "an official expression of inferiority toward black citizens."65 Fi-
nally, he stated that it was "disturbing" to lock the city into operating
pools "for an indefinite time in the future," merely because the pools
of Jackson had been segregated at some prior time.66 He concluded
that in light of all these factors, "this is neither the time nor the occa-
sion to be punitive toward Jackson for its past constitutional sins of
segregation."'67
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Palmer reveals some of the charac-
teristics of his developing race jurisprudence. As to scope, he in es-
sence refused to recognize Palmer as a race case, although it was a
close question for him. As to time, he was not prepared to view Jack-
son's history of segregation as the basis for finding a present-day dis-
criminatory animus. It was enough that Jackson had begun to comply
59. Id
60. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 228 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The use of the word "remained" underscor-
ing that he had struggled with the case.
62. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
63. See iL (Blackmun, J., concurring).
64. IM (Blackmun, J., concurring).
65. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
67. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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with desegregation orders in 1962; its former segregatory practices
were "past constitutional sins" that ought no longer to be punished.68
At the very least, the fact that this case involved a luxury and not a
necessary public service like education, made the case the wrong "oc-
casion" to punish the city. Justice Blackmun's focus was not single-
mindedly on the problem of race. Countervailing concerns of the
city's economic solvency and its freedom to set its own fiscal priorities
figured strongly into the decision. He did not take a clear stand on the
methodological question of legislative intent. He did, however, reject
the cultural approach the dissenters took to finding racism behind
seemingly neutral government actions - at least where, as in Palmer,
there were no specific facts in the record supporting the finding of
stigmatization. He was not prepared to trust intuition when it came to
ferreting out discriminatory meanings.
On all of these questions, Justice Blackmun's approach was trans-
parent. He admitted that this case might mean more than met the
eye. He acknowledged that there were strong countervailing argu-
ments that pointed to the racial nature of the city's policy. His struggle
was clear, and gave reason to think that he would be looking carefully
at the facts in subsequent cases to see if they could sway him to be
more like the judge who decided Smith and less like the judge who
decided Maxwell.
III. Attention to Method: Castaneda v. Partida
Castaneda v. Partida6 9 in which Justice Blackmun wrote for the
majority, was a pioneering case in the use of statistical methods to
prove discrimination. That is how students of Title VII know the case.
In it, Justice Blackmun set forth in a long footnote the statistical
method of proving discrimination that has become standard in the
field.7 ° What is less well known to Title VII scholars is the context of
the decision, which was a political setting that prefigured City of Rich-
mond v. J. A. Croson Co.71
Castaneda involved a claim of grand jury discrimination against
Mexican-Americans in Texas, a state that used a "key-man" system in
which jury commissioners select grand jurors.72 The Court had previ-
ously held the key-man system facially constitutional but "susceptible
68. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
69. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
70. See id. at 496-97 n.17.
71. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
72. Id at 484.
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to abuse as applied."73 Castaneda arose in Hidalgo County, a Mexi-
can-American majority county in which Mexican-Americans had a
"governing majority."'74 A majority of the judges (including the judge
who selected the jury commissioners and presided over the defend-
ant's trial), a majority of the elected officials, and a majority of the
jury commissioners were Mexican-American. The Court granted cer-
tiorari in the case to "consider whether the existence of a 'governing
majority' in itself can rebut a prima facie case of discrimination in
grand jury selection. '75 The statistical portion of the opinion goes to
the preliminary question of whether a prima facie case had been made
out in the first place.76
What was one to make of the fact that Mexican-Americans in
Hidalgo County - unlike blacks in the South - were a majority pres-
ence not merely in county population but in county governance, in-
cluding governance of the grand jury selection process? What weight
was one to give to the finding of the federal district court judge, who
was also Mexican-American, that both in general and in the circum-
stances of Hidalgo County, Mexican-Americans were not likely to dis-
criminate against other Mexican-Americans because of their race?77
Could intuition be trusted to provide an answer here, or, as was the
case for Justice Blackmun in Palmer, would the use of intuition be
regarded as merely "speculative"?
Justice Powell argued in dissent that much of the Court's Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence was based on the premise that "in-
dividuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, than against,
those who share their own identifiable attributes."78 Otherwise, he
asked, why would we worry about the adverse effects on a criminal
defendant of a jury (grand or otherwise) from which members of his
own race were excluded?79 Justice Marshall attacked Justice Powell's
approach to the "governing majority" question:
73. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497.
74. Partida v. Castaneda, 384 F. Supp. 79 (1974).
75. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 492.
76. See id. at 482.
77. Or, as he put it, "If people in charge can choose whom they want, it is unlikely they
will discriminate against themselves." Id. at 515 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting opinion of
Judge Garza in 384 F. Supp. 79, 90 (S.D. Tex. 1974)). Judge Garza thought that discrimina-
tion on the basis of socioeconomic class was the more likely explanation. See Castaneda,
430 U.S. at 492 n.11. Justice Blackmun left open the question "whether a showing of sim-
ple economic discrimination would be enough to make out a prima facie case in the ab-
sence of other evidence." Id.
78. 1& at 515 (Powell, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 516 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Social scientists agree that members of minority groups fre-
quently respond to discrimination and prejudice by attempting
to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of
adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority.
Such behavior occurs with particular frequency among members
of minority groups who have achieved some measure of eco-
nomic or political success and thereby have gained some accept-
ability among the dominant group.80
Even were this not true, Justice Marshall argued, "[i]f history has
taught us anything, it is the danger of relying on... stereotypes," such
as the view that Mexican-Americans in power would not discriminate
against other Mexican-Americans. 81
Here Justice Powell had the better of the argument. He was obvi-
ously right that our anti-discrimination jurisprudence is permeated by
the assumption (which ought not become impermissible by being
labled a "stereotype") that blacks and other minorities need the op-
portunity to be represented by members of their own group. Is it
proper to use this stereotype when doing so helps minorities (as in
voting rights or jury-representation cases) but not when it hurts mi-
norities (as in Castaneda)? Recall, for these purposes, Judge Black-
mun's predicament in Smith. Could one recognize the inferiority of
the teaching staffs of de jure-segregated black schools but deny that
inferiority when it came to projecting the likely effects of school clos-
ings on black teachers in a non-discriminatory process of creating a
unitary system? Also recall his approach to the use of intuition in
Maxwell and Palmer. In Maxwell, Judge Blackmun was unwilling to
fill in the gaps of a technically flawed statistical account based on the
intuition that the historically-charged connection between rape, race,
and the death penalty continued to operate throughout the South.8z
In Palmer, Judge Blackmun refused to trust the intuitions of those
who saw that swimming in the same pool as blacks and golfing on the
same course as blacks had sharply different resonances for whites in
the desegregating South.83 How would he handle Castaneda's battle
of conflicting intuitions?
It is in this context that the importance of the otherwise technical
and formal debate over the nature of the prima facie case in Cas-
taneda becomes clear. To Justice Blackmun, Hidalgo County's polit-
ical environment was to play no role in determining whether a prima
80. Id at 503 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
81. Id at 504 (Marshall, J., concurring).
82. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968).
83. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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facie case had been established. That question, he held, turns almost
entirely on the statistical evidence - tested for significance through the
statistical methods for which Castaneda is so well known. He ex-
plained that the proof structure he articulated is a "rule of exclusion,"
in which "[if] a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is
due solely to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, one must conclude that racial or other class-related fac-
tors entered into the selection process."' Only then may one ask
whether reference to Mexican-Americans' "governing majority" is ad-
equate to "rebut" the prima facie case. We have all learned with hind-
sight that one must be very clear about the nature of the burden which
shifts upon the establishment of a prima facie case.85 Is it a burden of
persuasion or merely one of production? Justice Blackmun's opinion
is not clear on this point.8 6 What is clear is that he considered the
statistical prima facie case to be weighty enough so that it could effec-
tively be rebutted only by the kind of evidence missing in the case -
namely, testimony by those responsible for jury selection that offered
a convincing explanation of how the statistical picture could have
been created by the consideration of factors other than race. 7
Justice Powell, writing in dissent, took a different view. To Justice
Powell, statistics standing alone could not make out a prima facie case.
To him, previous precedent established that "underrepresentation of a
population group . . . should be considered in light of 'such [other]
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available,"'8 8
including evidence tending to undercut the inference of intentional
discrimination which the statistics might otherwise support. In Justice
Powell's view, the political composition of Hidalgo County was such
evidence, and was compelling.89 Even if the "governing majority" evi-
dence were held irrelevant at the prima facie case stage, Justice Powell
argued, it was sufficient to rebut the statistical inference of discrimina-
tion.90 "Once the State has produced evidence - either by presenting
proof or by calling attention to facts subject to judicial notice - the
only question is whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to
84. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 n.13.
85. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
86. He cites previous cases that characterized the burden as one of "proof," but there-
after says (in ambiguous terms) that the state must "rebut" the prima facie case. Cas-
taneda, 430 U.S. at 494.
87. See id. at 500.
88. Id. at 513-14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 514 (Powell, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 515 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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demonstrate deliberate and systematic discrimination in the jury se-
lection process." 91
Proof structures and burden-shifting in discrimination cases have
taken much of the Court's attention in Title VII cases, for reasons and
with consequences I have explored at length elsewhere.9 Here we
are exploring the issue from the perspective of Justice Blackmun's
race jurisprudence, and that leads me to ask a more specific question.
Why, given his prior experience in race cases, would the proof struc-
ture he defended and elaborated in Castaneda have been so important
to him? I suspect the reason is that the proof structure he defends,
with its emphasis on statistical patterns, cabins the role of intuition in
discrimination cases. The problem of what one ought to presume
about the likelihood of within-group discrimination, he said, "is a
complex one, about which widely differing views can be held, and, as
such, it would be somewhat precipitate to take judicial notice of one
view over another on the basis of a record as barren as this."'93 The
best one could do in these circumstances, Justice Blackmun seemed to
be saying, is to put the issue aside and decide cases on less speculative
inferences.
Does the statistical method Justice Blackmun embraced in Cas-
taneda avoid speculative inferences about the nature of discrimina-
tion? Hardly. The "method of exclusion" he sets forth is all about
speculative inferences. The "idea behind the rule of exclusion" is that
"[ilf a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due
solely to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, one must conclude that racial or other [prohibited] class-re-
lated factors entered into the selection process."94 What is it that per-
mits the court to move from the defeat of the null hypothesis (ruling
out chance as the cause of a result at some agreed-upon level of confi-
dence) to the embrace of the hypothesis that it is race (or some other
prohibited "class-related factor") that accounts for the result? Why,
instead, should the advocate for race as the causal factor not have to
prove that it is specifically race, rather than some neutral factor that
correlates with race, that caused the disparity - as Judge Garza sug-
gested was the case in Castaneda? I do not think that the "rule of
exclusion" can be explained without recourse to an intuition that sub-
91. Id. at 517 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
MicH. L. REv. 2229-324 (1995).
93. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 499.
94. Id. at 494 n.13.
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jective processes are likely to be used to discriminate against legally
protected groups. By using the formal proof structures set forth in
Castaneda and similar cases, judges are freed from the need to use
their own intuitions, and members of minority groups are freed from
the risk that judges will intuit the world in ways adverse to their
interests.
What we see in Castaneda, then, is a Justice Blackmun who has
placed his faith in method. This method carries the hope that with
(seemingly) objective proof structures to serve as a buffer between
specific cases and general intuitions, justice will not turn on how well
particular judges understand the nature of race and race discrimina-
tion in American culture and society. Perhaps, too, Justice Black-
mun's approach in Castaneda stems from an unannounced sharpening
of his focus on the problem of race discrimination. If we credit Justice
Blackmun with the full implications of his mathematical sophistica-
tion, we must assume that he understood the ways in which the "rule
of exclusion" was based upon inference and intuition. If so, then his
embrace of this approach might best be understood as his expression
of the view that the interests of discrimination plaintiffs matter more
than those of defendants in close cases, and that doubts should there-
fore be resolved in plaintiffs' favor.
IV. The Afflrmative Action Decisions in Context: Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) and United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber (1979)
The powerful language of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke95 - and, as we shall see, in his
opinion in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 6 - would suggest
that Justice Blackmun had come fully to trust his own instincts on is-
sues of race by the late 1970s. However, a closer look at the opinions
suggest that he was still struggling, and therefore still had reason to be
sensitive to the need to maintain a race jurisprudence that could han-
dle uncertainty.
Take Bakke first. It is important to recognize that, for all Justice
Blackmun's calls to realism, the abstract notion of color-blindness still
had considerable appeal for him. Noted legal scholar Alexander
Bickel had called for color-blindness in his brief to the Court, and
95. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
96. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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Justice Blackmun responded as follows in his memorandum to the
Conference:
Alex Bickel's elegant and shining words, of course, speak of the
idealistic and have great appeal. But I say, once more, that this
is not an ideal world, yet. And, of course, his position is - and I
hope I offend no one, for I do not mean to do so - the "ac-
cepted" Jewish approach. It is to be noted that nearly all of the
responsible Jewish organizations who have filed amicus briefs
here are [on] one side of the case. They understandably want
"pure" equality and are willing to take their chances with it,
knowing that they have the inherent ability to excel and to live
with it successfully. Centuries of persecution and adversity and
discrimination have given the Jewish people this great attribute
to compete successfully and this remarkable fortitude.97
Part of Justice Blackmun's self-proclaimed realism in Bakke, then, was
a commitment not to hold all minority groups - and, specifically, not
to hold African-Americans - to the standard set by those minorities
who had been most successful in breaking into the elite professions.98
But this passage also suggests that Justice Blackmun was not prepared
to discount traditional "merit" standards. Certainly Justice Blackmun
made an important argument on the anti-"meritocracy" side of the
debate when he observed that it is "somewhat ironic" to be worried
about racial preferences when preferences are rampant in our soci-
ety,99 ranging from admissions preferences for legacies and athletes to
the public use of veterans' preferences and the progressive income
tax. Nevertheless, his treatment of the Jews' success does not question
its legitimacy or the legitimacy of the standards under which they suc-
ceeded. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun's unpublished comment on
affirmative action and the Jews also suggests some ways in which his
call to realism in Bakke was underspecified. What was it about the
experience of African-Americans that made it unrealistic to expect
them to progress without affirmative action? Could the same be said
about every other group that might come under the affirmative action
rubric? While it is certainly understandable that Justice Blackmun
chose not to explore the Jewish issue in his published opinion, he
showed through his memorandum that he was well aware that his
97. Blackmun Bakke Memo, supra note 2, at 11-12.
98. One may well disagree with Justice Blackmun's diagnosis of the reasons for Jewish
success, on which general question see Deborah C. Malamud, Is Affirmative Action Fair?
The Jew Taboo: Jewish Difference and the Affirmative Action Debate, 59 Omo ST. L.J. 915
(1998). The point here is that Justice Blackmun, while electing the Jews a model minority,
does not use their performance to set the standard by which all other minorities' needs
should be judged.
99. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 404.
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opinion would fail to silence an important set of critics of affirmative
action; namely, that set of Jewish intellectuals that eventually evolved
towards neoconservatism. 1° ° He also showed an awareness of some of
the important questions Bakke left open.
Note, too, that in his opinion in Bakke Justice Blackmun placed
considerable emphasis on deference to the expertise of educational
institutions, suggesting that his commitment to affirmative action
might depend on his willingness to trust the particular type of entity
engaging in it. He states that "[p]rograms of admission to institutions
of higher learning are basically a responsibility for academicians and
for administrators and the specialists they employ. The judiciary, in
contrast, is ill-equipped and poorly trained for this."'' One might
question whether he would be willing to say the same, for example, of
municipalities engaged in affirmative action in contracting or private
employers engaged in hiring. In the end he was, but his Bakke opin-
ion suggested that the answer was not a foregone conclusion.
Thus, for all its ringing language, Justice Blackmun's delibera-
tions and opinion in Bakke do not stand as evidence of a race jurispru-
dence in which minorities' interests were the sole focus of attention.
We still can see him engaged in personal struggle over the place of
color-consciousness and over the proper role of the judiciary in moni-
toring expert decisionmaking. Indeed, the ringing language for which
his opinion in Bakke is most known takes on greater significance in
light of the transparency of the opinion as a whole. Part of the persua-
sive power of Justice Blackmun's Bakke opinion lies in the manner in
which it provides a blueprint for those who, like him, could not en-
dorse affirmative action without a struggle.
The question of affirmative action in private employment soon
emerged in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,'02 solely under
the statutory rubric of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Here,
too, Justice Blackmun wrote separately after a period of careful post-
Conference deliberation.0 3 Even more so than in Bakke, the result
was an opinion transparent as to its doubts, but committed to putting
the needs of minorities first.
100. See Malamud, supra note 98, at 916 n.4.
101. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 404.
102. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
103. Justice Blackmun signaled when Justice Brennan circulated what became the ma-
jority opinion that "it is likely that I shall join your draft, but I ... prefer to see what is
written on the other side." Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers, Case Files,
Container 235 Folder 5, May 8, 1979 Memorandum. He joined Justice Brennan's opinion,
in the end, and also wrote an additional opinion of his own - as he did in Bakke.
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Justice Blackmun admitted, as surely it was wise to do, that there
was much to be said for the dissent's view that Title VII would never
have been enacted had it been known that it would be interpreted to
embrace affirmative action.' To Justice Blackmun, the intent of the
Congress that enacted Title VII was not dispositive. Instead, he fo-
cused on "additional considerations, practical and equitable, only par-
tially perceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress," that in his
view, "support the conclusion reached by the Court today."'1 5 Those
considerations resulted from an urgent need for voluntary compliance
with Title VII by employers whose past behavior might render them
liable under Title VII but who were far less likely to be cooperative
once they were sued. Justice Blackmun expressed a preference for
limiting voluntary affirmative action to those employers who had com-
mitted an "arguable violation" of the statute,10 6 but came to the reluc-
tant conclusion that the "arguable violation" standard was not
practical. Here again, practicality won out over competing considera-
tions. And, again, Justice Blackmun was not willing to reach what he
considered the "ironic" result called for by the dissent, under which
Title VII would be interpreted as "'locking in' the effects of segrega-
tion for which Title VII provides no remedy. '
But was Justice Blackmun correct in his view that Title VII would
otherwise provide no remedy for the discrimination underlying the
facts of a case like Weber? Justice Blackmun acknowledged that Kai-
ser Steel, the company whose collectively-bargained affirmative action
plan was at issue in the case, had imposed a past-experience require-
ment on new hires into the skilled trades "that arguably was not suffi-
ciently job related to justify under Title VII any discriminatory impact
it may have had."' 0 This meant that a conventional disparate impact
lawsuit could have been brought and possibly won. Surely it would
have been possible to use Title VII to sue the Steelworkers union local
that was continuing to discriminate against minorities in union mem-
bership and apprenticeship training. There were, to be sure, limits to
what could be done about the continuing effects of past discrimination
under Title VII. For example, Title VII would not permit a lawsuit
against the company and the union for failing to fire whites and hire
blacks or for continuing to use a seniority system that subjected new
104. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 215 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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hires to risks of layoff.10 9 These limits were not caused by legislative
sloppiness. The statute was controversial, and did not include every
provision its most liberal supporters would have wanted. The stated
aim of the statute was prospectively to eliminate discrimination in em-
ployment,110 and it provided methods for achieving its goals: media-
tion by the EEOC and, if mediation failed, litigation. There was no
irony at all in saying that the statute deprived employers of the option
of using affirmative action to avoid the embarrassment of a lawsuit.
Weber was far from being an easy case.
The step Justice Blackmun took in Weber is thus just as significant
as was Bakke for the development of his race jurisprudence. The fact
that he decided the case as he did demonstrates the depth of his com-
mitment to bringing about racial equality on the ground as quickly as
possible. Nonetheless, the opinion reveals a justice who was not en-
tirely comfortable with the step being taken, and who did not hesitate
to voice his wish that practical realities would permit a more cautious
approach.
Taken together, Bakke and Weber show that Justice Blackmun
had taken a decisive step in turning his focus to the needs of minori-
ties. However, one still senses struggle in these opinions; counter-
vailing voices still speak and demand to be heard. Just because he
took the stands he did in these early and important affirmative action
cases does not mean that the issue of race had become easy or clear
for him.
V. Race and the Death Penalty Revisited: McCleskey v.
Kemp (1987)
In the years between his Eighth Circuit opinion in Maxwell v.
Bishop"' and the Court's important decision in McCleskey v.
Kemp," 2 Justice Blackmun did not dwell in print on the racial dimen-
sion of the use of the death penalty. His account of his "excruciating
agony of the spirit""' 3 in enforcing the death penalty in Furman v.
Georgia did not discuss the issue of race. Yet, as we have seen, Judge
Blackmun in Maxwell was open to the development of superior statis-
109. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
110. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 203-07.
111. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968).
112. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
113. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972)(Blackmun, J., concurring). For dis-
cussion, see Stewart, supra note 34.
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tical evidence of the racial nature of death penalty enforcement. 114 In
McCleskey, he was satisfied with the statistical evidence developed by
the Baldus study. The Court's failure to accept the Baldus study was a
turning point for Justice Blackmun's death penalty jurisprudence.
McCleskey also has an independent and important place in Justice
Blackmun's race jurisprudence.
If one is looking for ringing language on the nature and subtlety
of race discrimination in criminal law enforcement in the South in Mc-
Cleskey, one must look to Justice Brennan's opinion. 115 What one
finds in Justice Blackmun's opinion, instead, is a far more technical
treatment of the proof structure for using statistics to prove inten-
tional discrimination as set forth in his earlier opinion in Castaneda.
Justice Blackmun's McCleskey dissent marks the beginnings of his re-
alization that proof structures and statistical methods cannot be
counted upon to convince those who do not intuitively sense the pres-
ence of race discrimination.
It was obvious in McCleskey that the state lacked the Baldus
group's sophistication in the use of statistical methods. The state won
despite having done little to respond to McCleskey's statistics. The
case turned, in part, on the question of burdens of proof. It is one
thing, in an employment discrimination case such as Bazemore v. Fri-
day1'6 (discussed by Justice Blackmun in a key passage in McCles-
key 1 7), for a court to conclude that the party opposing a statistical
showing of discrimination based on multiple regression or other com-
plex statistics bears a substantial burden in seeking to rebut them. But
the Court was obviously not prepared to impose the same burden of
statistical sophistication on the state in death penalty cases." 8
Even setting the question of burdens of proof aside, it is hard to
guarantee the outcome of battles over statistics. Just as Judge Black-
mun had rejected old evidence or evidence from distant counties in
Maxwell, the majority in McCleskey had precedent for insisting that
the statistical evidence be more closely particularized to cases like Mc-
Cleskey's, or that there be non-statistical evidence in the record to
114. Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 148.
115. There was an obvious division of labor between Justices Brennan and Blackmun in
the writing of dissents in McCleskey. Justice Brennan focused on the Eighth Amendment
and Justice Blackmun on the Fourteenth. I would doubt, however, that the division of
labor included a prior agreement as to the division of rhetoric.
116. 478 U.S. 385, 403-04 n.14 (1986).
117. 481 U.S. at 361.
118. Such was the case in Maxwell and Furman in which Justice Blackmun was wary of
unduly interfering with state discretion to impose the death penalty.
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suggest the precise mechanism through which discrimination operated
in McCleskey's case. Early on in the life of statistically-based cases
under Title VII, the Supreme Court acknowledged that statistics alone
make a poor prima facie case, that anecdotal evidence of particular-
ized instances of discrimination is necessary to bring the cold numbers
convincingly to life. 119 Statistics complex enough to capture the multi-
stage, multi-state process of death penalty enforcement become so
technical that bringing them to life requires something more than reit-
eration of the theory behind the "rule of exclusion."12 The problem
is that something other than evidence is needed to bring life to techni-
cal statistical cases. In the end, judges inevitably must use their own
systems of background beliefs to determine whether the story that
race accounts for the differences makes sense. It is there that the is-
sues Justice Brennan raised in McCleskey-the question of whether
we see the modem South as continuous with the South of slavery and
Jim Crow-become so crucial. They are no less so in a jurisprudence
dominated by the formality of proof structures and statistics. That in-
sight, we shall see, came to dominate Justice Blackmun's race jurispru-
dence in the years after McCleskey.
One final issue should be noted before moving from McCleskey.
One of the issues that surely shaped Justice Powell's approach to Mc-
Cleskey was an unwillingness to suspend the operation of otherwise
constitutional legal institutions until that infinitely receding day in the
future when the problem of racism would finally be solved. Even
when justices can be convinced to see race, they cannot always be con-
vinced to act upon what they see when doing so casts doubts on the
legitimacy of our system of justice. But was McCleskey such a case?
On this issue, Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens in a moderating
stance. 2' In their view, the pattern of race discrimination revealed by
the Baldus study did not require suspending the operation of the
death penalty in its entirety. The problem could be solved, they con-
tended, by restricting the death penalty to the most egregious cases -
because racial disparities in its use were minimal in such cases. 22 Mc-
Cleskey may well be a case in which passionate rhetoric (as found here
in Justice Brennan's opinion) stood in the way of a workable compro-
mise. Passion is not always a virtue in the jurisprudence of race.
119. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 343-56 (1977).
120. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 351-53.
121. See id. at 365-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 366 (Blackmun, J., joining the
dissenting opinion of Stevens, J.).
122. See id. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 366-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VI. The Battle Over Civil Rights in the October Terms of
1987 and 1988
If Justice Blackmun's faith in the ability of formal proof struc-
tures to persuade the unpersuaded was shaken in McCleskey, his very
sense of the solidity of the proof structures themselves was tested in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust" 3 and shattered in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio."4
1. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust (1988)
The issue upon which certiorari was granted in Watson was nar-
row, and, narrowly speaking, the Court was unanimous in its resolu-
tion. The question was whether the disparate impact proof structure
developed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," 5 a case involving objective
job requirements such as paper-and-pencil tests and high school diplo-
mas, was available in cases challenging subjective hiring practices. All
eight members of the Court who participated in the decision agreed
that it was. In explaining their reasoning, four justices (led by Justice
O'Connor) set forth an understanding of the Title VII proof structures
that differed markedly from the liberal orthodoxy on the subject, pro-
voking a dissent from Justice Blackmun.
Every element of the disparate impact proof structure was con-
troverted in the Watson opinions. Essentially the proof structure
works as follows. First, the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case by
establishing the existence of a statistical disparity in the effects of a
challenged hiring practice. Once the prima facie case is established,
an evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant who must then demon-
strate the "business necessity" or "job relatedness" of the challenged
practice. To Justice O'Connor and those for whom she wrote, the
shifted burden was a burden of production. To Justice Blackmun and
his contingent, it was a burden of persuasion. For Justice O'Connor's
group, the recurring phrase "business necessity" did not require a
showing of "necessity" at all, but something more akin to a showing of
rationality. For Justice Blackmun's group, the standard was far closer
to necessity.
Upon these distinctions rested what many - including Justice
Blackmun - had previously thought to be the difference between the
123. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
124. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
125. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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disparate impact and disparate treatment causes of action under Title
VII. He explained:
The prima facie case of disparate impact established by a show-
ing of a significant statistical disparity is notably different [from
the prima facie case in a disparate treatment case]. Unlike a
claim of intentional discrimination, which the McDonnell Doug-
las factors establish only by inference, tht disparate impact
caused by an employment practice is directly established by the
numerical disparity. Once an employment practice is shown to
have discriminatory consequences, an employer can escape lia-
bility only if it persuades the court that the selection process
producing the disparity has "a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question." The plaintiff in such a case already has
proved that the employment practice has an improper effect; it is
up to the employer to prove that the discriminatory effect is
justified.126
But why has the plaintiff who makes out a prima facie case proven an
improper effect? In a country in which discrimination in the social
goods antecedent to professional success (for example, education) is
still rampant, it should come as no surprise that employers' neutral
selection criteria will have disparate racial impacts. Why is it not the
case that the disparate racial impact only earns the label "improper"
once it becomes clear that the use of the criterion that causes the dis-
parate impact is unjustified?
Other elements of the Griggs proof structure were also contro-
verted in Watson. Generally, the dispute throughout was about where
the risk of uncertainty should lie in disparate impact cases. If the bur-
den that shifts is only one of production, then more plaintiffs will lose
their cases; if the standard is rationality rather than necessity, then
more plaintiffs will lose their cases; if the plaintiff must pin down the
precise practice that causes a racial disparity, then more plaintiffs will
lose their cases. Proof structures are, Watson showed, manipulable by
the courts that create them. The more technically and dispassionately
they have been discussed in the past, the more likely it is that a subse-
quent Court will feel justified in reevaluating the assumptions upon
which they are based - for doing so then appears merely as the contin-
ued adjustment of a machine, rather than as the sign of a repudiation
of past liberal values.
The Watson plurality was short one vote to make its vision of Ti-
tle VII the law. All that threatened to come to pass in Watson, and
more, came to pass the following term in Wards Cove. Between them
126. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)
(citations omitted) (second emphasis added).
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came another civil fights case in the area of race jurisprudence that
had been the source of Justice Blackmun's most important rhetorical
contributions: affirmative action.
2. City of Richmond v. Croson (1989)
In City of Richmond v. Croson,27 the Court applied strict scru-
tiny to Richmond, Virginia's program of race-based affirmative action
in public contracting. The task of drafting the primary dissent, in
which Justices Brennan and Blackmun also joined, was assigned to
Justice Marshall. Marshall's opinion both took on the specifics of the
Richmond plan and spoke more sweepingly:
It is a welcome symbol of racial progress when the former capi-
tal of the Confederacy acts forthrightly to confront the effects of
racial discrimination in its midst. ... Had the majority paused
for a moment on the facts of the Richmond experience, it would
have discovered that the city's leadership is deeply familiar with
what racial discrimination is .... When the legislatures and
leaders of cities with histories of pervasive discrimination testify
that past discrimination has infected one of their industries,
armchair cynicism like that exercised by the majority has no
place.128
However, as is so often the case in long opinions, these kernels were
buried amidst necessary but rhetorically less satisfying treatments of
the specific facts and equal protection issues presented by the case.
Here, Justice Blackmun was unwilling to let the moment pass without
a clearer statement of the significance of what had happened. In an
opinion joined by Justice Brennan, he wrote the language I quoted at
the beginning of this Article and will quote again here:
I never thought that I would live to see the day when the city of
Richmond, Virginia, the cradle of the Old Confederacy, sought
on its own, within a narrow confine, to lessen the stark impact of
persistent discrimination. But Richmond, to its great credit, ac-
ted. Yet this Court, the supposed bastion of equality, strikes
down Richmond's efforts as though discrimination had never ex-
isted or was not demonstrated in this particular litigation.... So
the Court today regresses. I am confident, however, that, given
time, it one day again will do its best to fulfill the great promises
of the Constitution's Preamble and of the guarantees embodied
in the Bill of Rights - a fulfillment that would make this Nation
very special. 129
127. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
128. Id. at 528, 544, 546 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 561-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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There is an important difference between Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Croson and his opinions in Bakke and Weber. The earlier
opinions attested to struggle; they aimed to make clear why someone
who took countervailing values seriously had come out in favor of af-
firmative action. In Croson, one must remember that the City of
Richmond had once been the bastion of the Confederacy, but was
now a majority-black jurisdiction with a majority-black city council.
Once that change had taken place, could reasonable minds differ as to
whether full economic equality could be attained without affirmative
action? And could reasonable minds also differ on whether a major-
ity-black legislature was entitled to deference in implementing pro-
grams that favored blacks?
The answer, I think, lies not in the facts or posture of Croson but
in the mood of the Court in that embattled Term. Watson had come at
the very end of the previous term, and heralded danger. One senses
from the rhetoric of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Croson that he
thought it important to stand witness to the magnitude of the shift that
was taking place. The Court had abandoned years of experimentation
with racial remedies and had reverted to color-blindness, despite the
fact that the time of "maturity" Justice Blackmun said in Bakke would
come someday had not yet arrived. The answer to that reversal of
spirit could not come from technical discussions of proof structures or
detailed accounts of the facts of cases. So Justice Blackmun made a
move into what I would call a prophetic mode: a rhetoric calling upon
the past and the future to stand witness to the momentous errors be-
ing committed in the present.
3. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
In Wards Cove,3 ° the Court revisited the issues upon which it
split in Watson, and the plurality gained its fifth vote. The facts of the
case sounded very different depending upon how one chose to tell
them.
Told one way, the story of the case was one of a modem planta-
tion in the Alaska fishery - indeed, Justices Stevens and Blackmun
both called it such in their dissents.13' As Justice Blackmun put it, the
company had a preference for hiring Asian workers for the worst jobs
in the cannery and keeping them there. Through a variety of prac-
tices, such as the refusal to take job applications on site and the opera-
tion of segregated dorms and eating facilities, the company kept its
130. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
131. See id at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); it at 663-64 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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upper-level jobs white and its lower-level jobs Asian. In so doing, the
company continued a long tradition in the cannery business. In fact,
the machine used for gutting fish was called the "Iron Chink" in mem-
ory of the flesh-and-blood Chinese who used to do the job and now
manned the machines. 32 Discrimination was pervasive at Wards
Cove, and to fail to use the disparate impact approach to stop it was
unconscionable.
Told another way, the story of the case was very different. The
plaintiffs had failed to prove intentional discrimination in the lower
courts, and did not appeal that loss to the Supreme Court. There were
thus no live allegations of intentional discrimination in the case. As
Justice White maintained for the majority, this meant that the "planta-
tion economy" claim was spurious; 133 plantations, after all, operated
on intentional discrimination and Wards Cove, at least for purposes of
the litigation at its present stage, did not. Instead, the plaintiffs were
claiming that each and every practice about which they had failed to
prove intentional discrimination was part of a vague multi-component
process that selected Asians for the worst jobs and barred their pro-
gress.13 1 The plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate with any specificity
the discriminatory impact of each of these practices. 35 Without such
a demonstration, the case was not properly a disparate impact case at
all.
In accepting Justice Brennan's invitation to write the dissenting
opinion in the case, Justice Stevens accepted but acknowledged to Jus-
tice Brennan that "my views may be closer to the majority than
yours.' 36 The result was a dissenting opinion that laid out the ways in
which the majority had misstated and misapplied the disparate impact
proof structure, and made the case for why the company should lose if
the structure were correctly applied. To Justice Blackmun, the opin-
ion was perhaps too dispassionate to serve as a marker for the signifi-
cance of what had happened. It was the kind of opinion Justice
Blackmun might have written the year before: it was technically care-
ful and relied on the history of the proof structures to make its case.
This time, however, just as he had in Croson, Justice Blackmun shifted
to a sharper rhetoric: "One wonders whether the majority still be-
lieves that race discrimination - or, more accurately, race discrimina-
132. Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485, 1503 (1993).
133. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650.
134. See id. at 657.
135. See id.
136. Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers, Opinions Files, Container 474
Folder 1 (Jan. 19, 1989 Memo).
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tion against nonwhites - is a problem in our society, or even
remembers that it ever was.' '1 37
The problem, in Wards Cove as in Croson, is that cases are not
merely symbols. They are also conjunctures of factual records and
legal doctrines. Disparate impact theory, with its emphasis on particu-
lar practices and their disparate effects, had been originally designed
for clearly identified and quantifiable job hurdles. At the time of
Griggs, one would hardly have expected that the disparate impact
cause of action would be relied upon in a case like Wards Cove. True,
one of the reasons why the Court had created the disparate impact
cause of action was because intentional discrimination was difficult to
prove. Nevertheless, that does not mean that every discrimination
case that could be won as an intentional discrimination case should
also be winnable as a disparate impact case. Rhetoric aside, Wards
Cove was a weak set of facts for the application of disparate impact
doctrine. Certainly Watson had opened the door to the use of dispa-
rate impact doctrine to challenge a wider range of employment prac-
tices, but it had not expressly invited the use of the doctrine to
challenge an employer's entire mode of recruiting and managing its
labor force. Furthermore, many of the challenged practices were not
in fact "facially neutral" at all, making it all the more awkward to use
disparate impact theory to challenge them. Had Wards Cove come
out the other way, it would have become difficult if not impossible to
detect the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact cases. Once one puts one's faith in a set of distinct proof struc-
tures, each with its own rules, one must live by them-and sometimes
even die by them.
VII. Revisiting the Death Penalty: Callins v. Collins
As the end of his time on the Court approached, Justice Black-
mun announced in Callins v. Collins'38 that he had become a death
penalty abolitionist. One of the reasons he offered was the unsolved
problem of race. "The arbitrariness inherent in the sentencer's discre-
tion to afford mercy is exacerbated by the problem of race... [W]e
may not be capable of devising procedural or substantive rules to pre-
vent the more subtle and often unconscious forms of racism from
creeping into the system.' 1 39 Recall that at the time of McCleskey,
Justice Blackmun was not prepared to go this far. His view in McCles-
137. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662.
138. 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994).
139. Id. at 1153-54.
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key was that the death penalty could stand in the most egregious capi-
tal murder cases, because those cases did not show a pattern of racial
disparity. But his moderating stance is absent in Callins. There is
every reason to believe that Justice Blackmun's intervening experi-
ence with the instability of proof structures in the Title VII cases had
robbed him of his prior faith that fair proof structures and rigorous
statistical methods could lead even the most race-insensitive judges to
fair results. With that faith gone, the problem of race became but one
more reason to switch to abolitionism.
Conclusion
Let us conclude by applying the theme of Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Callins, the inevitable link between discretion and arbitrari-
ness, to the general problem of race jurisprudence. What we have
seen in Justice Blackmun's race jurisprudence is an oscillation be-
tween intuition and science. Just as a death penalty jurisprudence
without discretion cannot speak in a human voice, a race jurispru-
dence without room for intuition and historical narrative cannot bring
the cold numbers convincingly to life. Just as a death penalty jurispru-
dence with too much discretion cannot assure system-wide fairness, a
race jurisprudence with no formal backbone depends too much on the
good fortune of finding a judge whose experiences foster intuitive un-
derstandings of race and racism. The dilemmas are the same in both
fields.
There is, however, one crucial difference. By taking the aboli-
tionist stance, Justice Blackmun could declare that "[fjrom this day
forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death."'140 But
there is no way Justice Blackmun, or any other justice, could ever free
himself of the obligation to tinker with the machinery of race.
That machinery, as we have seen, requires a constant adjustment
of one's judgment of the scope of race jurisprudence. It requires fre-
quent review of where we stand on the time line of the remediation of
race discrimination. It requires decisions about when it is appropriate
to focus solely on the need to remedy race discrimination and when
other institutional needs must take precedence. It requires the will-
ingness to explore methods of proof and to cabin them when they take
on an unwieldy life of their own. And it requires the entirely human
choice of whether leadership requires one to admit doubt or to hide it.
Justice Blackmun never achieved a uniform stance on all of these
140. Id. at 1145.
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questions, but uniformity is not necessarily virtue where race jurispru-
dence is concerned. Nor is virtue necessarily to be found in height-
ened rhetoric. Where virtue lies, instead, is in deep moral seriousness
about the problem, guarded optimism in the search for answers, and a
willingness to let go of yesterday's solutions as they reveal their limits.
These are the efforts that engaged Justice Blackmun's race jurispru-
dence. We have learned much from him.
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